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Abstract. We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices
from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying
decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice,
our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various
decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance
property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per
se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of
dominance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos.: D11, D81.
Keywords: Uncertainty, prospects, rational choice, decision theory.
1 Introduction
It is by now well-established that the choice behavior of an economic agent can be con-
sidered more fundamental than the optimization of some objective. An agent’s choices
can be observed directly and, recognizing this early on in the development of demand
analysis, Samuelson (1938; 1948) laid the foundations of what has come to be known as
revealed preference theory; see also Houthakker (1950), among others. A consumer’s de-
mand function is taken as the primitive of the problem and the basic question is whether
the observable behavior of this agent is consistent with the standard hypothesis of utility
maximization under budget constraints. Although these early contributions restricted at-
tention to consumer choice in perfectly competitive markets, the theory of rational choice
progressed rapidly and more general choice scenarios were analyzed in contributions such
as those of Richter (1966), Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1976a; 1977). Initially, the
analysis of rational choice behavior focused on models where a rationalizing relation was
assumed to be an ordering but, more recently, weaker coherence properties of a rational-
ization have been considered; see, for instance, Richter (1971) for an early contribution
in this spirit. A detailed review of rational choice and revealed preference theory can be
found in Bossert and Suzumura (2010).
Numerous theories of choice under uncertainty have emerged over the years; prominent
examples include proposals by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Milnor (1954),
Savage (1954), Barbera`, Barrett and Pattanaik (1984), Barbera` and Pattanaik (1984)
and Kannai and Peleg (1984). Both probabilistic and non-probabilistic choice models
(such as set-based models) are covered by these and other contributions. In this paper,
we aim at combining the theory of rational choice with a general approach to choice
situations under uncertainty.
In decision problems under certainty, the revealed preference approach typically does
not try to uncover a specific objective the optimization of which may be revealed through
the observed choices; rather, the fundamental question is whether these choices are con-
sistent with some objective in the sense that the choices from each feasible set are the
greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation. Analogously, we do not want to
restrict ourselves to a specific theory of choice under uncertainty. Our basic question is
whether observable choices can be consistent with some coherent way of making decisions
in the presence of uncertainty. We therefore use as our primitive a set of prospects. Sup-
pose there is a universal set X (with at least two members) of certain outcomes and a
finite number of (at least two) possible states of the world. A prospect assigns to each
1
possible state an outcome in X. We can think of a prospect as the result of an action
taken by an agent before the uncertainty regarding the state that actually occurs is re-
solved. The reason why we choose prospects to provide a fundamental description of our
choice situations is the generality we aim to achieve: if we were, for instance, to use lot-
teries as the objects to be chosen from, we would already be committed to a probabilistic
choice model. Because we do not want to rule out non-probabilistic models such as those
examined by Milnor (1954) and Barbera` and Pattanaik (1984), for instance, we choose to
use prospects as our basic representation of choice situations under uncertainty. However,
models that do endow a decision maker with a probability distribution are included as
special cases in our approach.
The definition of a decision rule that we use in this paper is based on what we think
is a minimal requirement. Given a choice function defined on a domain of sets of feasi-
ble prospects, we first demand that there be a relation that rationalizes the observable
choices in the usual sense of generating them as greatest elements in the requisite feasible
set. In addition, we ask that the rationalization satisfy a dominance property so as to
be interpretable as a choice rule under uncertainty. The dominance condition is easily
described: if two prospects x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , ym) are such that, for every
state i and for every state j, the certain prospect (xi, . . . , xi) that repeats outcome xi
in x over all states is revealed to be at least as good as the certain prospect (yj, . . . , yj)
that repeats outcome yj in y over all states, then prospect x must be at least as good as
prospect y. This is a very weak requirement because we do not demand state-by-state
dominance to be respected but, instead, merely unambiguous dominance where the worst
possible certain outcome in x is at least as good at the best possible certain outcome
in y. Although this condition that we impose in addition to rationalizability per se is
rather mild, it does impose further restrictions, as is shown once our formal framework is
introduced.
There is a resemblance to the analysis carried out by Bossert (2001) who also examines
rationalizability in the context of uncertainty. However, Bossert (2001) restricts atten-
tion to set-based models whereas our approach is considerably more general. Because of
the more specialized framework, Bossert’s (2001) restrictions differ from our dominance
property.
In the next section, we define the fundamentals of the problem to be addressed in this
paper, namely, the notions of prospects and choice functions. Section 3 provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for dominance rationalizability (that is, rationalizability by a
relation that respects the above-described dominance requirement). In sections 4 and 5,
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we add the coherence properties of transitivity and of Suzumura consistency, respectively,
to the list of requirements imposed on a rationalization. Section 6 concludes.
2 Prospects and choice functions
Suppose there is a set of alternatives or outcomes X with at least two elements. X
could be finite or infinite. There are m ∈ N \ {1} possible states of the world and a
prospect x = (x1, . . . , xm) with xi ∈ X for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} specifies, for each state,
the alternative that materializes in this state. The set of all prospects is denoted by
Xm. Important special cases of prospects are the certain prospects in which the same
outcome emerges in all possible states. For any x ∈ X, the certain prospect associated
with alternative x is x1m, where 1m denotes the m-dimensional vector that consists of
m ∈ N \ {1} ones. The set of all non-empty subsets of Xm is X .
A (binary) relation on Xm is a subset R of the Cartesian product Xm ×Xm and the
asymmetric part of R is P (R). The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R on Xm is
tc(R) = {(x,y) | there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . ,xK ∈ Xm such that
[x = x0 and (xk−1,xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y]}.
The transitive closure of a relation R is the smallest transitive relation containing R.
A relation R is Suzumura consistent if and only if, for all K ∈ N and for all x,y ∈ Xm,
(x,y) ∈ tc(R) ⇒ (x,y) 6∈ P (R).
The Suzumura consistent closure sc(R) of a relation R is given by
sc(R) = R ∪ {(x,y) | (x,y) ∈ tc(R) and (y,x) ∈ R}.
Suzumura consistency was first introduced in Suzumura (1976b). Analogous to the tran-
sitive closure of a relation, the Suzumura consistent closure of R is the smallest Suzumura
consistent relation containing R. The notion of a Suzumura consistent closure is due to
Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005). See Bossert and Suzumura (2010) for a detailed
discussion of Suzumura consistency and its use in individual and collective choice.
We assume that, in the presence of uncertainty, a decision maker faces a set of feasible
actions and that each action leads to a prospect in Xm. Rather than working with
actions and their induced prospects, we work with prospects directly in order to simplify
our exposition. Thus, a choice rule under uncertainty can be expressed by means of a
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choice function that selects, from each feasible set of prospects in its domain, a non-empty
subset of this feasible set. The only assumption (other than non-emptiness) that we make
about the domain of a choice function is that it includes all singletons and pairs of certain
prospects. Formally, a choice function with a certainty inclusive domain is a mapping
C: Σ → X such that {{x1m, y1m} | x, y ∈ X} ⊆ Σ ⊆ X and C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ Σ.
Because the certainty inclusiveness assumption will be maintained throughout the paper,
we will simply refer to C as a choice function with the understanding that this function
has a certainty inclusive domain.
3 Dominance rationalizability
As is well-known, a choice function C is rationalizable by a binary relation R on Xm if
and only if, for each feasible set of prospects S in the domain Σ, C selects the R-greatest
elements in S. However, in the present context of choice under uncertainty, we might
want to impose more than just the standard rationalizability property in order to think
of a choice function as representing a plausible method of selecting from sets of available
prospects. Clearly, there are many theories of choice under uncertainty such as those
pioneered and discussed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Milnor (1954), Savage
(1954), Fishburn (1970), Arrow and Hurwicz (1972), Ga¨rdenfors (1976), Kim and Roush
(1980), Barbera`, Barrett and Pattanaik (1984), Barbera` and Pattanaik (1984), Kannai
and Peleg (1984), Barbera`, Bossert and Pattanaik (2004), to name but a few.
The main purpose of the approach advocated in this paper is not the identification
of a specific theory of choice under uncertainty but, rather, to define a more general
criterion that subsumes many of the models proposed so far. Clearly, this means that
our definition of possible choice rules is quite permissive. In addition to probabilistic
choice rules such as those proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) or Savage
(1954), our class of choice rules includes many others that are not based on (objective or
subjective) probabilities, such as those discussed by Milnor (1954) or Kannai and Peleg
(1984), for instance. Of course, our definition of possible choice rules still has some bite in
that it allows us to eliminate rules that we consider unacceptable given our interpretation;
this is illustrated below via a simple example. As we discuss in the concluding section,
our approach can be amended in a straightforward and intuitive manner if one desires to
come up with a more stringent definition. What we think of as the major contribution of
this paper is the method we propose to incorporate notions of uncertainty into a model
of rational choice.
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Coming back to our definition of rationalizability in the current context, we propose
as a minimal requirement that, in addition to rationalizability per se, a weak dominance
property be respected. More precisely, we demand that observed choices involving certain
prospects be respected in the following sense. Consider two prospects x = (x1, . . . , xm)
and y = (y1, . . . , ym). If every certain prospect xi1m with i ∈ {1, . . . , m} is revealed to
be weakly preferred to every certain prospect yj1m with j ∈ {1, . . . , m} in the sense that
xi1m is chosen in a situation where yj1m is feasible, then the relation rationalizing C
must declare x to be at least as good as y. Formally, we say that a choice function C is
dominance rationalizable if and only if there exists a relation R on Xm such that
C(S) = {x ∈ S | (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S} for all S ∈ Σ (1)
and
[(xi1m, yj1m) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m} ⇒ (x,y) ∈ R] for all x,y ∈ Xm. (2)
If C and R are such that (1) and (2) are satisfied, we also say that R is a dominance
rationalization of C or that C is dominance rationalized by R.
Property (1) represents the standard rationalizability requirement: for any feasible set
S in the domain of a choice function C, the set of chosen elements C(S) must coincide
with the set of R-greatest elements in S according to a (dominance) rationalization R.
That (2) imposes additional restrictions on C can be seen by considering the following
example. Suppose that the set of certain alternatives is X = {x, y, z}, that there are
m = 2 possible states of the world, and the certainty inclusive domain of C is given by
Σ = {{(x, x)}, {(y, y)}, {(z, z)},
{(x, x), (y, y)}, {(x, x), (z, z)}, {(y, y), (z, z)},
{(x, y), (y, z)}}.
Now define the choice function C by letting
C({(x, x)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(y, y)}) = {(y, y)}, C({(z, z)}) = {(z, z)},
C({(x, x), (y, y)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(x, x), (z, z)}) = {(x, x)}, C({(y, y), (z, z)}) = {(y, y)},
C({(x, y), (y, z)}) = {(y, z)}.
Consider the relation R on Xm defined by
R = {((x, x), (x, x)), ((y, y), (y, y)), ((z, z), (z, z)),
((x, x), (y, y)), ((x, x), (z, z)), ((y, y), (z, z)),
((y, z), (x, y))}.
5
It is straightforward to verify that (1) is satisfied for C and R. However, there exists no
relation R′ such that, for C and R′, (2) is satisfied in addition to (1). By way of contra-
diction, suppose R′ is such a relation. First of all, as a consequence of (1) and the defini-
tion of C, we must have ((x, x), (y, y)) ∈ R′, ((y, y), (y, y)) ∈ R′, ((x, x), (z, z)) ∈ R′ and
((y, y), (z, z)) ∈ R′. Thus, (2) implies ((x, y), (y, z)) ∈ R′. Therefore, the prospect (x, y) is
an R′-greatest element in {(x, y), (y, z)} and (1) demands that (x, y) ∈ C({(x, y), (y, z)}),
in contradiction to the definition of C. Thus, even though the additional property that
we require of a rationalization in the context of choice under uncertainty is very weak,
it is not redundant and can be used to eliminate rules that are in violation of the basic
dominance condition (2).
Richter (1971) characterizes rational choice in a general setting where no additional
requirements such as that expressed by (2) are imposed. In our framework, an analogous
result can be obtained by modifying his necessary and sufficient condition in a suitable
manner. To do so, we first introduce the notion of the direct revealed preference relation
RdC associated with a choice function C. This relation is defined by letting, for all x,y ∈
Xm,
(x,y) ∈ RdC ⇔ there exists S ∈ Σ such that [x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S] .
Because we have to take into account the dominance property in addition to mere ratio-
nalizability, we consider the following relation that incorporates this requirement. The
direct revealed preference and dominance relation RC corresponding to C is defined by
letting, for all x,y ∈ Xm,
(x,y) ∈ RC ⇔ (x,y) ∈ RdC or
[
(xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}
]
.
Following Samuelson’s (1938; 1948) observation in the context of rationality in con-
sumer choice problems, Richter (1971) establishes that the direct revealed preference
relation RdC associated with a choice function C must be respected by any rationalizing
relation R in the sense that RdC is contained in R. An analogous result is valid in our
setting. However, because of the additional dominance requirement we impose, the rela-
tion RC rather than RdC must be respected when choices are made from sets of feasible
prospects. This leads to the following result, which is analogous to the above-mentioned
observation due to Richter (1971).
Lemma 1 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a relation R, then RC ⊆ R.
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Proof. Suppose that R is a dominance rationalization of C and that (x,y) ∈ RC . By
definition of RC , there are two possible cases:
(a) (x,y) ∈ RdC ;
(b) (xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
In case (a), the definition of RdC implies that there exists S ∈ Σ such that x ∈ C(S)
and y ∈ S. Thus, x is an R-greatest element in S by (1) which, together with y ∈ S,
implies (x,y) ∈ R.
In case (b), the result just established for case (a) implies that (xi1m, yj1m) ∈ R for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By (2), it follows that (x,y) ∈ R.
We can now use this lemma to characterize dominance rationalizability. Again, the
method of proof is based on that employed by Richter (1971). In our framework, however,
some additional steps are needed as a consequence of imposing the dominance require-
ment. The following property of a choice function C turns out to be necessary and
sufficient for dominance rationalizability.
Direct dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ Xm,
(x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
Direct dominance revelation coherence requires that the relation RC be respected by the
choice function C. It is relatively straightforward to see that this is indeed necessary for
dominance rationalizability. As established in the following theorem, the property is also
sufficient.
Theorem 1 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable if and only if C satisfies
direct dominance revelation coherence.
Proof. We first prove the only if part of the equivalence stated in the theorem. Suppose
R is a dominance rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S be such that (x,y) ∈ RC
for all y ∈ S. By Lemma 1, it follows that (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S. Because R is a
dominance rationalization of C, this implies x ∈ C(S) and direct dominance revelation
coherence is established.
To prove the if part of the theorem, suppose that C satisfies direct dominance reve-
lation coherence. We now show that R = RC is a dominance rationalization of C.
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To establish that (1) is satisfied for R = RC , suppose first that S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S are
such that (x,y) ∈ RC for all y ∈ S. Direct dominance revelation coherence immediately
implies x ∈ C(S).
Now suppose that S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S are such that x ∈ C(S). By definition, this
implies (x,y) ∈ RdC for all y ∈ S and, because RdC ⊆ RC , we obtain (x,y) ∈ RC for all
y ∈ S.
Finally, we show that (2) is satisfied for R = RC . Suppose x,y ∈ Xm are such that
(xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By definition of RC , for each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
there are two possible cases:
(a) (xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RdC ;
(b) ((xi1m)g, (yj1m)h) ∈ RdC for all g, h ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Because (xi1m)g = xi and (yj1m)h = yj for all g, h ∈ {1, . . . , m}, (xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RdC
follows in both cases. Thus, by definition of RC , we obtain (x,y) ∈ RC and the proof is
complete.
Note that the above proof does not make use of the assumption that C is a choice function
with a certainty inclusive domain; the conclusion of Theorem 1 remains true if Σ can be
any arbitrary non-empty domain. However, the certainty inclusiveness of Σ is crucial for
the results to be established in the following two sections.
4 Transitive dominance rationalizability
In traditional choice models that do not involve uncertainty, demanding rationalizability
without any further restrictions on the rationalizing relation can be considered somewhat
unsatisfactory. If, for instance, all rationalizations of a choice function generate strict
preference cycles, it is difficult to think of the choice behavior thus revealed as coherent.
The same reasoning applies to dominance rationalizability in the context of choosing from
feasible sets of prospects: in addition to (1) and (2), one may want to demand that a
dominance rationalization possesses some coherence property such as the well-established
transitivity requirement. In this section, we show how transitivity can be incorporated
into our model of choice under uncertainty. Interestingly, as mentioned at the end of
the previous section, the certainty inclusiveness assumption on the domain of a choice
function is important for the main result of this section.
8
Lemma 1 has a natural counterpart in the transitive setting (see Richter, 1971). All
that needs to be done is to replace the relation RC with its transitive closure tc(RC) so
that we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a transitive relation R,
then tc(RC) ⊆ R.
Proof. Suppose that R is a transitive dominance rationalization of C and that (x,y) ∈
tc(RC). Thus, there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . ,xK ∈ Xm such that x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RC
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. By Lemma 1, it follows that x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ R
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. Because R is transitive, we obtain (x,y) ∈ R.
Our characterization of dominance rationalizability by a transitive relation relies on the
assumption that the domain of C is certainty inclusive. Adapting direct dominance reve-
lation coherence to the transitive framework considered in this section is straightforward
and the requisite necessary and sufficient condition is obtained by replacing RC with its
transitive closure tc(RC).
Transitive dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ Xm,
(x,y) ∈ tc(RC) for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
The main result of this section characterizes dominance rationalizability by a transitive
relation.
Theorem 2 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable by a transitive relation if
and only if C satisfies transitive dominance revelation coherence.
Proof. The proof of the only if part of the theorem is a straightforward adaptation of
the proof of the only if part of Theorem 1; we leave it to the reader to verify that all that
is required is to replace RC with tc(RC) and Lemma 1 with Lemma 2.
To prove the if part of the theorem, suppose that C satisfies transitive dominance
revelation coherence. We show that R = tc(RC) is a transitive dominance rationalization
of C.
Clearly, R = tc(RC) is transitive by definition.
To establish that (1) is satisfied for R = tc(RC), suppose first that S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S
are such that (x,y) ∈ tc(RC) for all y ∈ S. By transitive dominance revelation coherence,
x ∈ C(S).
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Now suppose that S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S are such that x ∈ C(S). By definition, this implies
(x,y) ∈ RdC for all y ∈ S and, because RdC ⊆ RC ⊆ tc(RC), we obtain (x,y) ∈ tc(RC) for
all y ∈ S.
Finally, we show that (2) is satisfied for R = tc(RC). Suppose x,y ∈ Xm are such
that
(xi1m, yj1m) ∈ tc(RC) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. (3)
Because Σ is a certainty inclusive domain, {xi1m, yj1m} ∈ Σ for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Because tc(RC) dominance rationalizes C, (3) implies xi1m ∈ C({xi1m, yj1m}) for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, by definition of the direct revealed preference relation, we have
(xi1m, yj1m) ∈ RdC for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. By definition of RdC , we obtain (x,y) ∈ RC
and, because RC ⊆ tc(RC), it follows that (x,y) ∈ tc(RC) = R.
5 Suzumura consistent dominance rationalizability
Full transitivity is often considered too demanding a requirement, especially in (but not
restricted to) the context of collective choice. Thus, it is worthwhile to study the possibil-
ity of obtaining characterization results that employ notions of dominance rationalizability
that are weaker than transitive dominance rationalizability and stronger than mere dom-
inance rationalizability. One possibility to do so is to explore dominance rationalizability
by a Suzumura consistent relation. The reason why we focus on Suzumura consistency as
a suitable weakening of transitivity rather than on alternative properties such as quasi-
transitivity or acyclicity is discussed in the concluding section of the paper.
As in the previous section, our starting point is an analogue of Lemma 1 where RC is
replaced with its Suzumura consistent closure sc(RC).
Lemma 3 If a choice function C is dominance rationalized by a Suzumura consistent
relation R, then sc(RC) ⊆ R.
Proof. Suppose that R is a Suzumura consistent dominance rationalization of C and
that (x,y) ∈ sc(RC). By definition, we can distinguish two cases.
(a) (x,y) ∈ RC ;
(b) (x,y) ∈ tc(RC) and (y,x) ∈ RC .
In case (a), Lemma 1 implies (x,y) ∈ R.
In case (b), there exist K ∈ N and x0, . . . ,xK ∈ Xm such that x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ RC
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. Moreover, (y,x) ∈ RC . By Lemma 1, it follows that
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x = x0, (xk−1,xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y. Therefore, (x,y) ∈ tc(RC).
Furthermore, (y,x) ∈ R as a consequence of Lemma 1. If (x,y) 6∈ R, it follows that
(y,x) ∈ P (R). Because (x,y) ∈ tc(RC), this contradicts the Suzumura consistency of R.
Thus, (x,y) ∈ R.
A necessary and sufficient condition for dominance rationalizability by a Suzumura con-
sistent relation is obtained by employing the Suzumura consistent closure instead of the
transitive closure when formulating the requisite coherence property.
Suzumura consistent dominance revelation coherence. For all S ∈ Σ and for all
x ∈ Xm,
(x,y) ∈ sc(RC) for all y ∈ S ⇒ x ∈ C(S).
The proof of our final characterization result is analogous to that of Theorem 2; we leave
it to the reader to verify that all that is required is to replace the transitive closure with
the Suzumura consistent closure and Lemma 2 with Lemma 3.
Theorem 3 A choice function C is dominance rationalizable by a Suzumura consistent
relation if and only if C satisfies Suzumura consistent dominance revelation coherence.
6 Concluding remarks
In traditional models of rational choice on general domains without uncertainty, rational-
izability by a transitive relation is equivalent to rationalizability by a reflexive, complete
and transitive relation; see Richter (1966). The same observation applies to the current
framework. Richter’s (1966) proof technique employs a variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) ex-
tension theorem and proceeds by showing that any extension of the transitive closure of
the direct revealed preference relation to a reflexive, complete and transitive relation also
rationalizes C. That the dominance property does not change this result follows from
the assumption that we operate on certainty inclusive domains. As a consequence of this
property, the restriction of the direct revealed preference relation (and, thus, the restric-
tion of RC) to the set of certain prospects is already reflexive and complete. Therefore,
no new pairs need to be added to the original relation as a consequence of the domi-
nance requirement. However, the same argument does not apply to arbitrary domains
because the above-mentioned reflexivity and completeness property of the restriction of
RC is not guaranteed without assuming that Σ is certainty inclusive. This means that
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there may exist extensions that do not obey the restrictions imposed by the definition
of dominance rationalizability by a transitive relation, and existential clauses may have
to be invoked to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions. See Bossert (2001) for
analogous observations in the more restricted framework of set-based decision rules.
In contrast, Suzumura consistent dominance revelation coherence is not sufficient for
dominance rationalizability by a reflexive, complete and Suzumura consistent relation.
This is an immediate consequence of the observation that Suzumura consistency and
transitivity coincide in the presence of reflexivity and completeness; see Suzumura (1976b).
The reason why we focus on Suzumura consistency as the weakening of transitivity to
be considered is that properties such as quasi-transitivity or acyclicity cannot be treated in
an analogous fashion. This is the case because there is no such thing as a quasi-transitive or
an acyclical closure: if a relation fails to be quasi-transitive or acyclical, there is no unique
way of defining a unique superset of this relation that possesses the requisite property. For
instance, if x is strictly preferred to y, y is strictly preferred to z and z is strictly preferred
to x, the resulting relation clearly is not acyclical (and, of course, not quasi-transitive).
In order to obtain a superset of this relation that is acyclical, one of the pairs (y,x), (z,y)
or (x, z) has to be added to the original relation, but any one of the three possibilities
will do. Analogously, to obtain a quasi-transitive superset of the relation, two of the three
pairs need to be added but, again, any two will do the job. Thus, there is no well-defined
closure operation for these properties and, as a consequence, a condition that demands
such a closure to be respected cannot be formulated. This observation also applies to
dominance rationalizability by itself: because there does not exist a complete closure of a
relation, our condition does not work if we want to obtain dominance rationalizability by a
reflexive and complete relation. See Bossert and Suzumura (2010) for a detailed discussion
of these issues in the traditional rational choice framework without uncertainty.
Our definition of the class of possible decision rules is very permissive—the dominance
requirement appears to be quite uncontroversial. If one intends to come up with more
restrictive notions of suitable decision models, the method suggested here may be applied
to this alternative setting. Because of this observation, we think of this paper as pro-
viding two contributions: in addition to the results that we consider to be of interest in
themselves, we propose a general method that can be employed when applying theories
of rational choice to the analysis of decision making under uncertainty.
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